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Abstract
Using a new dataset, we investigate the determinants of violence
against women in Africa. We focus on cultural factors arising from
pre-colonial customs and nd evidence consistent with two hypothe-
ses. First, ancient socioeconomic conditions determine social norms
about gender roles, family structures and intrafamily violence which
persist even when the initial conditions change. Norms about marriage
patterns, living arrangements and the productive role of women are as-
sociated with contemporary violence. Second, women's contemporary
economic role aects violence in a complex way which is itself related to
traditional norms in pre-colonial times and current bargaining power
within the marriage.
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1 Introduction
Violence perpetrated by men against their female partners is widespread
around the world. It is a fundamental violation of women's human rights,
and is also a signicant public health problem, with signicant economic and
social costs. Victims of violence suer physical and psychological distress,
they may suer isolation, experience a decline in labor productivity and
loss of wages, with consequences on children's health and education.1. The
World Health Organization (2013) estimates that more than one third of
women in the world have been victims of either physical or sexual violence,
with low income countries disproportionately aected.
In this paper we assess how economic and cultural factors inuence cur-
rent spousal violence in Africa using data on domestic violence from the
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). We combine these data with in-
formation on ancestral anthropological and cultural practices of the ethnic
group to which the woman belongs, taken from Murdock's Ethnographic
Atlas. The resulting new dataset allows us to uncover the role played by
cultural origin in shaping contemporary attitudes towards and experience
of domestic violence.
We nd evidence for two interrelated hypotheses. The rst is that the
economic productivity of women aects men's violence against them. When
in ancient times socioeconomic arrangements made women economically
valuable, social norms developed in ways that viewed women as produc-
tive, more equal to men and these gender roles bring about less intrafam-
ily violence. However, additional and subtle factors may come into play.
An economically more independent woman may also have more bargaining
power within the marriage, which may lead to a negative reaction of men
and ultimately to an increase {as opposed to a decrease{ in violence. Indeed,
when exploring contemporaneous correlates of intimate partner violence, we
nd that if women currently work, spousal violence against them is higher.
1See the World Health Organization (2004). Carbone-Lopez, Kruttschnitt and Macmil-
lan (2006) estimate the contributions of dierent types of intimate partner violence ex-
posure to physical health, mental health and substance abuse. Duvvury, Callan, Carney
and Raghavendra (2013) provide a review of dierent costing methodologies and types of
costs related to domestic violence that can be estimated depending on data availability.
Women's Advocates Inc. (2002) calculates that intimate partner violence costs the US
economy $12.6 billion on an annual basis, that is, 0:12 percent of the GDP. This estimate
includes legal and medical services, judicial system costs and lost productivity. Unfor-
tunately, estimates of the costs associated with spousal violence are only available for
developed countries, no similar studies were found for Sub-Saharan Africa.
The second (related) hypothesis is that past socioeconomic conditions de-
termine persistent cultural values regarding the family, and violence against
women. These values are persistent even when the initial conditions which
generated them evolve or disappear. We nd that in societies where women
were actively involved in subsistence activities (e.g., those based upon gath-
ering), women's role was more highly regarded and violence against women
is lower today. On the contrary, violence is higher in societies based upon
plough agriculture, where women participated less in agriculture (see Alesina,
Giuliano and Nunn, 2013) and in shing and hunting societies, which were
mainly male activities, at least in our sample. Also ancestral living condi-
tions of dierent ethnicities aect current levels of violence.
Female descendants of societies characterized by brideprice in the past
are exposed to a lower probability and a lower intensity of violence today.
This suggests that if men traditionally had to pay for marrying their wives,
they attributed a greater value to them and they cared more about them.
Interestingly, in line with this argument, lower actual violence is empirically
associated with a lower acceptability of wife beating on the part of men.
Furthermore, being from an ethnicity that was traditionally endogamous
(i.e., where members marry within the same ethnic group) has a positive
and signicant impact on spousal violence episodes. This may reect less
\modern" cultural values of ethnicities which practiced endogamy, or the
possibility that beating a wife from a dierent ethnic group may bring about
retaliation across ethnicities. We also nd that where the stem family (a
small extended family in which two generations cohabit, as one son stays at
the parental homestead with his wife and children) was socially predominant
in the past, both men and women tend to be less favorable to violence. This
result conrms for Africa the hypothesis advanced and tested by Tur-Prats
(2015) for Spain, namely that in stem families wives have more time to work
on the farm, while the mother in law takes care of the children, hence they
become more `valuable'.
Finally, we explore the role of dierent types of settlements and nd
that women whose ancestors lived in nomadic and isolated settlements are
exposed to a higher probability of violence and are more prone to justify
it. Men whose ancestors lived in compact settlements are less likely to
justify abuses against their wives. One interpretation is that nomadic and
isolated settlements represent less developed communities; another is that
societal protection of women is more dicult within these types of living
arrangements.
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Our paper makes two contributions to the existing literature. First, to
the best of our knowledge, our work is the rst one to combine data for
all DHS surveys available for Africa in order to investigate contemporane-
ous as well as ancestral correlates of spousal violence and attitudes towards
it.2 Second, by assembling an original dataset that matches ethnic groups
in the DHS with information on ancestral characteristics from Murdock's
Ethnographic Atlas, we are able to shed light on the origin and long term
persistence of gender norms conducive to gender based violence. Our nd-
ings highlight the importance of considering deeply rooted social norms when
discussing policies aimed at preventing or stopping domestic violence in low
income countries.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
a brief review of the literature related to this subject. Section 3 describes
the data and our matching procedures. Section 4 presents the empirical
strategy and the results. Section 5 oers some robustness checks. The last
section concludes.
2 Related literature and hypotheses
2.1 The literature
The present paper is related to the literature on the determinants of domestic
violence and on the persistence of cultural values.
The literature on domestic violence cuts across disciplinary boundaries
(see Lawson (2012) for a survey). One branch of sociological studies em-
braces a \feminist perspective" which analyzes violence against women as an
expression of male dominance (e.g., Dobash and Dobash (1979) and Jonhson
(1995)). Instead the `ecological theory' underlines the importance of envi-
ronmental factors and social relations and relates violence against women
to various micro and macro variables inside and outside the family.3 The
exchange and social control theory calls attention to the relative benets
and costs of domestic violence for the individual and emphasizes the role of
social control against family violence which may increase the cost of violence
for men (e.g., Gelles (1983) and Gelles and Strauss (1988)).
2Heise and Kotsadsam (2015) and Cools and Kotsadam (2015) evaluate dierent cor-
relates of domestic violence and attitudes towards this phenomenon, but they focus just
on contemporaneous correlates.
3See Heise (1998) for a discussion of how to reconcile the two perspectives.
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In recent years, a large literature has investigated the link between in-
come gap and spousal violence. The pioneering study is Gelles (1976), who
observes that the fewer resources a woman has, the more likely she is to be
abused. Farmer and Tiefenthaler (1997) conclude that in the United States
an improvement in women's economic opportunities leads to a decline in
spousal violence. Bowlus and Seitz (2006) use structural methods to esti-
mate a negative eect of female employment on abuse. Aizer (2010) exploits
administrative data to build a new measure of violence, based on female
hospitalizations for assault, and she concludes that the decline in wage gap
occurred in previous years reduces violence against women.4 Heise and Kot-
sadam (2015) use data from DHS and WHO and observe that partner's
violence is less prevalent in countries with a high proportion of women in
the work force, but working for cash increases a woman's risk in countries
where women employment is lower. Cools and Kotsadam (2015), like Gelles
(1976), conclude that resource inequality, both within the household and at
the aggregate level, is associated with more spousal abuse in Africa.
Another view posits that spousal violence is a bargaining instrument,
adopted by the husband to impose his control (Anderson, (1997); Gart-
ner and Macmillan (1999); Johnson and Ferraro (2000)). This is the so-
called male backlash theory, according to which husbands feel their author-
ity threatened if their wives work, so they use violence as a way to reinstate
their power. Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan (2015) nd that in the United
States couples where the wife earns more than the husband are less happy,
are more likely to divorce and the wife spends more time on household
chores. In societies that are more patriarchal and conservative and where
divorce is not socially accepted, growing tensions within the couple gener-
ated by increasing economic opportunities for women may result in higher
levels of intimate partner violence. Bloch and Rao (2002) nd that in In-
dia, women whose family of origin is richer are more likely to be victims of
domestic violence. Given that divorce is stigmatized, a woman can hardly
escape from an abusive husband. Since violence is interpreted as a signal of
husband's dissatisfaction, the only way for a woman's parents to stop the
husband's abuses is to pay him. Economists and psychologists have recently
investigated how a violent behavior can be a reaction to frustration. Card
4The relationship between income gap and intimate partner violence has been analyzed
also by criminologists. They developed a theory of exposure reduction according to which
an increase in employment among either men or women will negatively aect domestic
violence, by reducing the time partners spend together (Dugan, Nagin and Rosenfeld,
1999).
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and Dahl (2011) show that an unexpected loss when the home football team
is the favorite is associated with an increase in the rate of intimate partner
violence.
Secondly, our work relates to the literature on the impact of historical
legacies on current outcomes of violence. Pollak (2004) shows a high de-
gree of intergenerational correlation of spousal violence.5 The importance
of intergenerational transmission for shaping gender roles is also stressed by
Thornton, Alwin and Camburn (1983) and Fernandez, Fogli and Olivetti
(2004). Tur-Prats (2015) focuses on Spain, and shows that territories where
stem family was socially predominant in the past are characterized by a
lower prevalence of domestic violence today.6 She explains this nding with
a model in which co-residence with the mother-in-law increases the produc-
tive role of the wife, improving her participation in agricultural activities.
The presence of an older woman in the household decreases the burden of
domestic work for the wife, freeing up time for farming.
Probably the paper more directly related to ours, at least methodologi-
cally, is by Michalopoulos, Putterman and Weil (2014). They estimate the
eect of ancestral lifeways on current economic outcomes, focusing on Sub-
Saharan Africa and matching individual data from the Demographic and
Health Surveys with ethnographic characteristics of distinct ethnic groups
from Ethnographic Atlas. They observe that descendants of societies that
were traditionally dependent on agriculture are wealthier and better edu-
cated. While they investigate the impact of descending from ethnicities that
traditionally practiced agriculture on distinct current outcomes (men's ed-
ucation, wealth, etc.), we focus specically on domestic violence and we try
to uncover the role played by a broader set of cultural and societal factors.
The economic literature has also tried to provide an explanation about
the distant origins of gender roles. Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013) em-
pirically test Ester Boserup's hypothesis that dierences in gender roles are
determined by historical agricultural practices. In particular, descendants
of societies that practiced plough agriculture prior to industrialization are
characterized by more unequal gender norms today. This is due to the fact
that the use of plough required more physical strength, so in societies based
on plough women started to be relegated into the domestic sphere. Con-
5This is consitent with the argument by Wolfang and Ferracuti (1967) on the intergen-
erational trasmission of a culture of violence.
6A stem family is a family arrangement in which two generations cohabit, since one son
stays at the parental homestead with his wife and kids. It is the opposite of nuclear family,
where all children leave the parents' household to start their independent household.
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versely, in hoe culture, women were more likely to work outside the home
and assume more important social roles, a feature that was then transmitted
to their female descendants. They test these predictions and conclude that
descendants of societies that practiced plough agriculture are characterized
by a higher degree of gender inequality today. Studying the variation in
poligamy across African societies, Fenske (2015) shows that districts that
received more colonial teachers in French West Africa and areas that re-
ceived more Christian missions have lower polygamy rates today.
2.2 Our hypothesis
The available literature suggests two main interrelated hypotheses which we
will test on African data. The rst is the role of the economic productivity
of women as a determinant of domestic violence. To the extent that women
are more valuable, in economic terms, violence should decline since the hus-
band does not want to `damage' physically and psychologically a productive
member of the family. On the other hand, women who are more economi-
cally active also gain power in intrafamily bargaining. This may be dicult
for the husband to accept, and even become unacceptable for some men in
cases where the wife is more productive (e.g, receives a higher wage or more
generally brings home more money or goods) than the husband. This second
eect may lead to an increase in intrafamily violence.
The second hypothesis we test relates to the persistence over time of cul-
tural values, and specically of values regarding gender roles, family organi-
zation and gender based violence. Pre-colonial socioeconomic arrangements,
often related to geographic conditions, led to certain family structures and
gender roles, which in turn favoured or discouraged violence against women.
We hypothesize that these cultural traits may have persisted even when the
original socioeconomic conditions changed.
3 Data
3.1 Demographic and Health Surveys
We combine several data sources. Our main data source is constituted by
the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), a series of representative cross-
sectional surveys of women and men aged 15-49 in randomly selected house-
holds. We use the most recently available DHS wave for those African coun-
tries for which either the domestic violence module or data on attitudes
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towards intimate partner violence are available.7 In order to match the
DHS individual level data with Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas (see below)
we need to restrict the analysis to only those DHS waves in which the eth-
nicity or language of the household members was collected. We use language
spoken at home or native language as a proxy for ethnicity when information
on respondent's ethnic group is not available. We analyze intimate partner
violence at three dierent levels: (i) actual episodes of violence experienced
by women, and attitudes towards violence of (ii) women and (iii) men.
Actual violence experienced. We consider all the women selected
and interviewed for the domestic violence module which is included in some
DHS survey rounds for 18 countries.8 Eliciting information on domestic
violence is dicult for obvious reasons, but the DHS protocol has high stan-
dards to ensure high data quality. First, the domestic violence module is
administered to only one (randomly selected) woman per household: this
ensures that other respondents in the household will not know about the
questions she was asked. Informed consent for the survey is obtained from
the respondent at the beginning of the individual interview. At the begin-
ning of the domestic violence section, respondents are read an additional
statement informing them that the subsequent questions could be sensitive
and reassuring them of the condentiality of their responses. The domestic
violence module is then implemented only if privacy is obtained. For each
one of the 18 countries, we merge the women dataset with the household
one, so that each woman is attributed to her corresponding household. We
then match individual-level data with Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas, as-
signing to each individual in the DHS the ancestral characteristics of her
ethnic group in the Atlas. We end up with 96; 077 women in the sample.
Attitudes towards violence. We exploit a set of attitudinal mea-
sures that reect a combination of attitudes towards domestic violence and
attitudes towards women. The respondents are asked whether a husband is
justied in hitting or beating his wife under dierent circumstances: the wife
goes out without telling him; the wife neglects their children; the wife argues
7We decided to consider only African countries because the number of non-African
countries for which both the violence module and data on the ethnicity (or language) of
the respondent are available is negligible.
8The survey rounds in the respective countries are: BF6 (Burkina Faso, 2010),
CD6 (Congo Democratic Republic, 2013-2014), CI6 (Cote d'Ivoire, 2011-2012), CM6
(Cameroon,2011), GA6 (Gabon, 2012), GH5 (Ghana, 2008), KE5 (Kenya, 2008-2009),
ML5 (Mali, 2006), MW5 (Malawi, 2006), MZ6 (Mozambique, 2011), NG6 (Nigeria, 2013),
NM6 (Namibia, 2013), RW6 (Rwanda, 2010), SL6 (Sierra Leone, 2013), TG6 (Togo, 2013-
2014), UG6 (Uganda, 2011), ZM5 (Zambia, 2013-2014), ZW6 (Zimbabwe, 2010-2011).
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with him; the wife refuses to have sex with him; the wife burns the food.
The women sample includes 28 African countries, while the male sample 27.9
After having assigned each individual in the DHS to his/her corresponding
ethnic group in the Ethnographic Atlas, we have 266; 657 observations for
women and 120; 099 for men.
3.2 Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas and matching with DHS
Our second data source is the Ethnographic Atlas, a worldwide ethnicity-
level database constructed by George Peter Murdock, which collects ethno-
graphic information for 1; 267 ethnic groups and contains over one hundred
ethnographic variables taken from societies prior to industrialization. We
use the Atlas to combine individual level data from contemporary Africa
with information on the ancestral ethnicities of respondents. Matching the
DHS with the Ethnographic Atlas requires the construction of a concor-
dance of ethnicities, since names of ethnic groups in the DHS do not always
coincide with the ones in the Atlas. Overall, we have 717 ethnicities in the
DHS and we are able to match 315 of them. Our matching procedure fol-
lows and adapts Michalopoulos, Putterman and Weil (2014).10 In order to
9The survey rounds in the respective countries are: BF6(Burkina Faso, 2010), BJ6 (Be-
nin, 2011-2012), CD6(Congo Democratic Republic, 2013-2014), CG6(Congo-Brazzaville,
2011-2012), CI6(Cote d'Ivoire, 2011-2012), CM6(Cameroon,2011), GA6(Gabon, 2012),
GH5(Ghana, 2008), ET6(Ethiopia, 2011), GN6(Guinea, 2012), KE5(Kenya, 2008-
2009), LB6(Liberia, 2013), LS5(Lesotho, 2009), ML5(Mali, 2006), MW5(Malawi, 2006),
MZ6(Mozambique, 2011), NI6(Niger, 2012), NG6(Nigeria, 2013), NM6(Namibia, 2013),
RW6(Rwanda, 2010), SL6(Sierra Leone, 2013), SN6(Senegal, 2010-2011), SZ5(Swaziland,
2006-2007), TD4(Chad, 2004), TG6(Togo, 2013-2014), UG6(Uganda, 2011), ZM5(Zambia,
2013-2014), ZW6(Zimbabwe, 2010-2011). Niger (NI6) is not included in the male sample
because data on religion, which we include in all regressions as a control, is not collected
for men.
10Even though in our matching procedure we follow Michalopoulos, Putterman and Weil
(2014), we make some changes. First of all, they do not distinguish between Ethnologue
and the Joshua Project, but they devise three dierent matching techniques which use
data on ethnicities' names from either Ethnologue or the Joshua Project: (i) DHS and
Murdock names are alternative names according to Ethnologue or the Joshua Project; (ii)
a name in Murdock's Atlas is listed as a macro ethnicity that includes the ethnicity in the
DHS, according to Ethnologue or the Joshua Project; and (iii) an ethnicity in Murdock's
Atlas is part of a larger ethnicity in the DHS, according to either Ethnologue or the Joshua
Project. Since this distinction is not relevant for our purposes, we do not separate these
three cases, while we consider Ethnologue and the Joshua Project as separate sources.
Secondly, Michalopoulos, Putterman and Weil mention \other sources" in the list of their
matching strategies, including also Wikipedia in this category. Given that Wikipedia
allows us to match a signicant number of observations, we decide to list it as a separate
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reconcile the ethnic aliation in the DHS with the one in Murdock's Atlas,
we consider seven possible methods and we order them on the basis of their
accuracy. Then, following this ordered list, we adopt the rst method that
allows to achieve a match between the two datasets. Table 1 illustrates all
the matching strategies, with the number and the share of observations and
ethnicities that are matched using each strategy.
[Insert Table 1]
The easiest case is the one in which the name of the ethnicity in the DHS
is exactly the same as the one used by Murdock. Unfortunately we are able
to directly match only 18:1 percent of the DHS ethnic groups, corresponding
to 32:9 percent of the observations. When direct matching is impossible, we
use the dataset constructed by Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), which pro-
vides a concordance between the ethnicities in the Afrobarometer and those
in the Ethnographic Atlas. An example is the DHS ethnicity \Urhobo",
which is included among the Afrobarometer ethnic groups in Nunn and
Wantchekon's (2011) dataset, where it is associated to the ethnic group
that appears as \Isoko" in the Atlas. Using this approach, we match 6:6
percent of the DHS ethnicities, corresponding to 10:9 percent of the obser-
vations in our sample. The third method relies on Ethnologue, a catalogue
of more than 6700 languages spoken in 228 countries. Three dierent cases
are possible: (i) DHS and Murdock names are listed as alternative names
by Ethnologue; (ii) a name in Murdock's Atlas is listed as a superset of
the ethnicity in the DHS, i.e. it is a macro category that includes also the
ethnicity in the DHS; and (iii) a name in Murdock's Atlas is a subset of
a DHS ethnic group, i.e., it is a smaller ethnic group which is included in
a larger ethnicity. Michalopoulos, Putterman and Weil (2014) keep these
three approaches separate. However, since this distinction is not relevant
for our purposes, we combine these three categories into a single category,
referred to as Ethnologue. For instance, the DHS ethnic group \Ndola" can
be called also \Ndoola", \Njoyane", \Nundoro" or \Ndoro". Since the last
one appears in the Ethnographic Atlas, we are able to match it with the DHS
ethnicity of interest. Overall, 12:3 percent of the ethnicities are matched us-
ing Ethnologue, which accounts for 14:3 percent of the observations. The
fourth method uses data on alternative ethnicity names from the Joshua
source. Finally, we introduce a new source, referred to as \two sources" in Table 1. More
specically, when the available information is ambiguous, we use two sources together to
achieve a concordance between the DHS and Murdock names.
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Project and we can have the same three cases described for Ethnologue.
For example, according to the Joshua Project, the DHS name \Sheko" is
an alternate name of \Shako", an ethnicity that is present in Murdock's
Atlas. The Joshua Project allows us to match 1:4 percent of the ethnici-
ties and 0:5 percent of the observations in the sample. When the ethnicity
name reported in the DHS does not appear neither in Ethnologue nor in the
Joshua Project, we check whether Wikipedia mentions possible alternate
names for that ethnic group. For instance, the DHS name \Gourmatche"
is listed as an alternative name for \Gurma", present in the Ethnographic
Atlas. Overall, 2:9 percent of the DHS ethnic groups are matched with the
Atlas using Wikipedia, for a total of 8 percent of the observations. In some
cases, two sources are needed in order to achieve a concordance between
the DHS and Murdock names. For example, \Mandingue" is a DHS eth-
nicity which has some alternate names according to Ethnologue (\Mande",
\Mandingo", \Mandinka"). However, none of them appears in Murdock's
Atlas, while \Mandinka" is listed by Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) within
the Afrobarometer names and it is associated with \Malinke" in the Atlas.
1:8 percent of the DHS ethnicities are matched with the Ethnographic Atlas
using two sources, for a total of 6:5 percent of the observations. Finally, we
employ two additional sources (peoplegroups.org and zyama.com) when the
available information is ambiguous and leaves some doubts on the reliabil-
ity of the matching. They allow to match 0:8 percent of the DHS names,
corresponding to 0:1 percent of the observations.
Overall we are able to match 73:2 percent of the DHS observations: a
total of 386; 802 individuals are matched to a Murdock's Atlas group and as-
signed ancestral characteristics of the corresponding ethnicity in the Ethno-
graphic Atlas.
3.3 Descriptive statistics
Appendix Table A.1 lists the variables we use in our empirical analysis and
their sources. Section A2 and Section A3 of the Appendix provide a detailed





Table 2 reports summary statistics. The indicator variable `Violence at-
titude' takes value 1 if the respondent believes that violence is acceptable in
at least one out of ve circumstances included in the survey: going out with-
out telling the husband; neglecting the children; arguing with the husband;
refusing to have sex with the husband; and burning the food. The rst row
of Table 2 shows that 46 percent of women justify wife beating in at least one
circumstance, while the corresponding gure for men is 34 percent. As an
alternative measure, we construct the `Violence attitude index' as the sum
of the circumstances in which the respondent thinks it would be acceptable
for a man to beat his wife. The average number of episodes in which spousal
violence is justied is 1:3 (out of 5) for female respondents and 0:76 for male
ones. We also report the fraction of women and men justifying wife beating
in each of the ve circumstances included in the `Violence attitude index'.
The circumstance under which both female and male respondents justify
more husband's abuses is when the wife neglects the children: 32 percent of
women believe that violence is acceptable in this case, while this share re-
duces to 21 percent for men. Almost one out of three women justies spousal
violence if the wife argues with the husband and a similar share of female
respondents believes that wife beating is acceptable when the wife goes out
without telling the husband.11 Note that men's attitudes towards spousal
violence may be aected by underreporting, because men could hinder their
true views in order not to look bad in front of the interviewer, although this
may hold also for women.
In the bottom part of Table 2 we examine variables that capture the
actual violence experienced by female respondents. Note that the sample
size is smaller because this module is administered by the DHS only in 18
African countries, as we discussed in Section 3.1. According to our rst
indicator variable, `Violence ever', 29 percent of women have experienced
either sexual or physical violence since the age of 15. In the latest twelve
months prior to the survey (`Violence last year'), the fraction is 22 percent.
The information on the occurrence of each episode of spousal violence allows
us to also construct an indicator for the intensity of violence. This variable is
computed as the sum of dierent types of physical and/or sexual aggression
to which the woman has been exposed ever since age 15 (`Violence index
ever') and during the twelve months prior to the survey (`Violence index
11Domestic violence seems to be slightly less accepted by both women and men when the
wife refuses to have sex with the husband and when she burns the food, even if the share
of individuals justifying violent behaviors under these circumstances remains worrisome.
11
last year'). This index ranges from 0 to 6 and it has a mean of 0:63 when
focusing on violence ever experienced and of 0:46 when considering the past
year.
Overall, the descriptive patterns in Table 2 suggest that domestic vio-
lence is relatively widespread in contemporary Africa. This is even more




Table 3 reports summary statistics on the long term cultural and eco-
nomic variables that we employ in the analysis. In this table we use the
sample of all women with data on domestic violence attitudes; summary
statistics of ancestral characteristics for the (smaller) sample with informa-
tion on actual violence are reported in Appendix Table A.2. After matching
modern ethnicities in the DHS with ancestral tribes in the Ethnographic At-
las, we assign to each respondent the characteristics of his/her corresponding
ethnic group in Murdock's dataset. Murdock's Atlas contains information
on production activities prior to industrialization. In our African sample,
agriculture was the main source of subsistence prior to industrialization: 97
percent of respondents' ancestors mainly relied on agriculture, while the av-
erage share of subsistence provided by agricultural activities was 62 percent
(variable `Dependence on agriculture'). Only 6 percent of women's ances-
tors in our sample traditionally used the plough.12. The Ethnographic Atlas
lists four other production activities (gathering, hunting, shing and animal
husbandry) and the share of subsistence they provided is, respectively, :06;
:09; :09 and :19.
In addition, the Atlas reports for each production activity the following
gender participation categories: males only, males appreciably more; equal
participation; females appreciably more; and females only. Using this infor-
mation, we construct an indicator variable equal to one if there was equal
gender participation, or if women contributed more than men or if women
12In Murdock's data, ethnicities are classied into one of the following mutual exclusive
categories: the plough was absent; the plough existed but it was not aboriginal; the plough
was aboriginal and found in the society prior to contact. Using this categorization, we
construct an indicator variable equal to 1 if the society used the plough (whether aboriginal
or not) and zero otherwise.
12
were the only participants to the production activity, and zero otherwise.13
Descriptive statistics reported in Table 3 suggest that gathering and agri-
culture were characterized by equal gender participation or higher female
participation compared to men's (recall that for the vast majority of our
sample we have plough negative agriculture). Animal husbandry was prac-
ticed by both men and women, while shing was a predominantly male
activity.14
We next focus on a set of variables describing ancestral marriage and
living arrangements. 92 percent of women have ancestors whose mode of
marriage was characterized by brideprice, that is a payment in monetary
terms or in kind to the bride's family (variable `Brideprice').15. 22 percent of
women's ancestors practiced endogamy, the custom of marrying exclusively
within a specic ethnic or social group. The prevalence of `stem family',
i.e., an arrangement where two generations cohabit, is 25 percent. Polygyny
(a form of plural marriage in which a man is allowed to have more than
one wife) is an ancestral characteristic of 97 percent of the respondents, and
virilocality (a marriage arrangement according to which a married couple
resides with or near the husband's parents) was prevalent for 85 percent of
them.
We then provide descriptive evidence also for alternative types of set-
tlements (sedentary, nomadic, compact and isolated): the vast majority of
women's ancestors lived in sedentary settlements. The last rows of Table 3
report summary statistics for inheritance norms adopted by ancestral soci-
eties. Gender equality in land inheritance, with land equally divided between
daughters and sons, was practiced in only 5 percent of the cases. In addi-
tion, 14 percent of women's ancestors followed a matrilineal descent system,
meaning that an individual's descent was traced through the mother and her
maternal ancestors, and a man's property was inherited by his sister's sons
instead of his own children. Finally, the last row of Table 3 suggests that
primogeniture was applied to land inheritance in 63 percent of the cases, at
13The original classication in Murdock's Atlas makes a distinction between \dierenti-
ated but equal participation" and \equal participation, no marked dierentiation". Since
this distinction is not relevant for our purpose, we combine these two categories. If the
activity is present but participation by gender is not specied, or if the activity is absent,
our variable takes a missing value.
14We don't report female participation in hunting in the table because the mean is
exactly zero.
15The dummy `Brideprice' is equal to 1 if the prevalent mode of marriage prior to
industrialization was characterized by brideprice or wealth to bride's family, bride service
to bride's family or token brideprice in the denition of Murdock's Atlas.
13
least before the economy opened up to industrialization.
Summary statistics for the socioeconomic controls that we use in our re-
gressions are reported in Appendix Table A.3. The rst panel of this table
refers to the sample of all African countries for which data on attitudes to-
wards domestic violence are available, while the second panel refers to the 18
African countries where data on actual violence experienced are collected.16
4 Empirical strategy and results
4.1 Empirical model
We estimate the following regression:
V iolenceigc = c +   Ethnog + Xigc + igc (1)
where V iolenceigc is the outcome of interest for individual i from ethnicity
g in country c. This is the `actual' violence dummy (or index) when we
consider violence episodes experienced by the woman, and the violence `at-
titudes' dummy or index when we focus on women's and men's attitudes.17
Ethnog indicates the ancestral characteristic of interest of a given ethnicity
g, derived from Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas. It can refer to ancient living
arrangements, distinct types of production activities, dierent marriage pat-
terns or dierent inheritance norms. Xigc is a vector of individual controls
including woman's and partner's age and years of education, a dummy equal
to one if the woman is currently working, the number of children ever born
and the household size, a wealth index, a dummy for urban residence and a
set of religion dummies.18. c is a vector of country xed eects. Standard
16For the attitudes regressions, the female sample includes 28 countries, while the male
sample includes 27 countries.
17In Appendix A.2 we provide a detailed description of how these dierent measures of
violence are constructed.
18The DHS wealth index is an indicator of household's economic status. It is a con-
tinuous variable and it is constructed using principal component analysis, starting from
household's assets.
Angelucci (2008), evaluating the impact of the program Oportunidades on domestic
violence and alcohol abuse, observes that violence increases with woman's age but with
diminishing marginal returns. In order to check whether the relationship between age
and violence is nonlinear, we included woman's and partner's age squared. Since the
coecients of woman's and man's age squared were typically insignicant, we decided to
include only age, without its square, in our nal specication.
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errors are clustered at the ethnicity level.
When the outcome is binary, we estimate the regression using a linear
probability model (OLS) and Probit. When the dependent variable is a
count variable (i.e., in the case of the violence index), we use ordinary least
squares (OLS) and a Poisson model. We report OLS estimates in the main
text, and refer the reader to Section 5 for the Probit and Poisson models.
4.2 Current economic correlates of domestic violence
Table 4 shows the individual and contemporaneous correlates of various
measures of violence against women.
[Insert Table 4]
The results are quite meaningful. Violence (actual and tolerated) de-
creases with age and education both of the woman and of the partner and
the propensity to justify husband's abuses is also negatively correlated with
wealth. This may reect the fact that wealthier and more educated families
are subject to less stressful conditions and this makes them less likely to
resort to violence, or it may simply reect preferences for exerting violence
that negatively correlate with education and wealth. Household size and the
number of births that the woman had are positively correlated with violence,
probably due to the stress of supporting large families. Other explanations
are also possible, though, such as the presence of unobserved factors corre-
lated with household size, or reverse causality if the violence was motivated
by an attempt on behalf of the man to induce the woman to have more
children.
In urban areas violence occurs more frequently but it is less justied by
men and women. Urbanization is one of the few variables for which the
results on actual violence reported and on attitudes do not go in the same
direction. Reporting bias could be one interpretation of this discrepancy:
urban women may be more open to revealing that they have been beaten,
while at the same time being less accepting of it. Another possibility is
that residents of urban areas in Africa are experiencing a faster transition
from traditional norms that considered gender based violence acceptable to
modern ones that condemn it, and that the dichotomy between tradition
and modernization in the short run gives rise to increasing levels of violence
by men whose identity is challenged by the new systems of beliefs.
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The occurrence of violence (but not acceptance) is increasing when women
work. This may be associated with women having a stronger bargaining
power within the family and therefore posing a potential threat to the dom-
inating role of the husband, consistent with the `male backlash' theory. Note
that the variable `Working' captures whether the woman under cosideration
is currently working. Below we will investigate how the economic role of
women in the past generated cultural attitudes related to current domestic
violence.
We now move to examine how past socioeconomic arrangements may
aect current level of violence due to the persistence of attitudes and cul-
tural values. All the variables listed in Table 4 are included as controls in
every regression we present in the next sections but their coecients are
not reported for brevity. The coecients on the individual controls are very
stable.
4.3 Cultural determinants of domestic violence
Economic value of women
Table 5 reports our results on how ancestral characteristics pertaining to the
economic value of women aect contemporary violence. Each panel in the
table focuses on a dierent explanatory variable and reports the coecient
on the variable of interest (other controls are included but not reported), the
number of observations, the R-squared and the mean of dependent variable
in the subsample considered, to help assess the magnitude of the estimated
eect in relation to the mean.
[Insert Table 5]
In the rst regression we consider the economic value of the woman as
implicit in marriage payments. The dummy `Brideprice' is equal to 1 if
the prevalent mode of marriage of the respondent's ethnic group prior to
industrialization was characterized by brideprice, i.e., if the husband had to
make a payment to obtain a wife, as opposed to receiving a dowry or not
making any payment.19 More than 90 percent of individuals in our sample
have ancestors who practiced brideprice.
Anthropologists, demographers and economists have advanced various the-
ories to explain under which conditions brideprice, instead of dowries, is
19In terms of Murdock's classication, our variable includes brideprice or wealth to the
bride's family, bride service to the bride's family and token bride price.
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more likely to prevail (Botticini, 2003). According to Becker (1981), mar-
riage payments clear the market when sex ratios are unbalanced. Therefore,
in a society where women are less numerous, a man will pay a brideprice in
order to attract a bride. Goody (1973) instead claims that dowry is a form of
inheritance from the bride's parents to the bride. In societies with dowries,
sons receive inheritance, while daughters receive wealth transfers from their
parents in the form of dowries at the time of marriage. According to this
theory, dowries are more likely to prevail in stratied societies, characterized
by higher wealth and status inequality. On the contrary, brideprice is more
likely to emerge where there is little social and economic stratication, and
this could explain why brideprice is more common than dowries in many
African societies. Finally, Boserup (1970) argues that brideprice is more
likely to emerge in economies in which agriculture is based on shifting hoe
cultivation, such as most African societies. In this context, women are ac-
tively engaged in agricultural activities and, by paying a brideprice to the
bride's family, the groom acquires the right to the bride's labor force. Thus,
on the one hand, brideprice could be interpreted as an explicit recognition
of women's value. On the other hand, it could limit women's independence,
due to shame and fear deriving from breaking a marital relationship and re-
turning to their parental house, without being able to repay the brideprice
(Ansell, 2001).20
Our results support the rst argument. Having brideprice in the past
is associated with a decrease of 11:5 percentage points in the probability of
ever being exposed to spousal violence. This is a very large eect considering
that the average probability of violence in our sample is 27:1 percent. When
we use as dependent variable the violence index (column 2), which counts
the number of violence episodes to which the woman has been subjected, the
coecient on brideprice is  0:35, signicant at the 1 percent level. Interest-
ingly, in line with the argument about the value of wives, the eect of lower
actual violence seems to be driven by a lower acceptance of wife beating on
the part of the man: in brideprice-paying societies the likelihood of justify-
ing a husband's choice to beat his wife declines by 6 percentage points for
the male sample (column 5) and also the number of circumstances in which
beating is justied by men (column 6) is signicantly lower.
20In line with this argument, Horne, Nii-Amoo Dodoo and Dodua Dodoo (2013) conduct
a vignette experiment in Ghana's Volta region and observe that when a man has paid a
brideprice, he gains the right to the woman's reproductive services. In other words, after
brideprice payment, wives defer to their husbands for reproductive choices.
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The remaining panels of table 5 refer to the economic value of women
as determined by traditional modes of production. We construct a binary
variable equal to one if the society used the plough (whether aboriginal
or not) and zero otherwise.21 The coecients of the variable `Plough' in
columns 1 and 2 of panel B indicate that the descendants of societies that
practiced plough agriculture experience a higher degree of violence today.
Women whose ancestors practiced plough agriculture are 13:2 percentage
points more likely to be victims of husband's aggressions. This is a large
eect, representing a 50 percent increase over the mean.
We next consider the role of overall dependence on agriculture, as op-
posed to hunting, shing, gathering and pastoralism. The idea is that in
economies based on agriculture, especially without the plough like in most
of our sample, women could participate more in the labor force and develop
a more equal status in society and in the family, and this may generate
norms of greater respect for women, similar to what we found above for
brideprice. Indeed, the qualitative pattern of results in panel C of table 5
is consistent with this interpretation: the dummy `Agriculture main source'
displays negative coecients in all regressions, although it is only signicant
when we consider the violence attitude index for the female sample (column
4).
In the next ve panels of Table 5, instead of relying on dichotomous
variables, we employ continuous indicators capturing the share of total pro-
duction accounted for by various activities. For example, the variable `De-
pendence on agriculture' in panel D indicates the share of total subsistence
activities accounted for by agriculture in the respondent's ethnic group. This
variable is insignicant, although with the expected sign. Dependence on
gathering reduces the likelihood and intensity of violence experienced by
women (columns 1-2 of panel E), consistent with the fact that gathering is
the activity with the highest share of female labor force participation rela-
tive to men (see Table 3). Dependence on shing and hunting, which are
practiced almost exclusively by men in our sample, are associated with more
violence towards women today. We nd no correlation between dependence
on animal husbandry and spousal violence.
Finally, following Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013) we consider land
suitability for plough cultivations as an exogenous determinant of whether
the plough is used and of whether women traditionally engaged in farming.
In panel I of Table 5 we regress our domestic violence outcomes on land
21Note that in our sample very few ethnicities used the plough.
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suitability for plough-positive and plough-negative crops.22 The two mea-
sures for plough-positive and plough-negative crops have been constructed
following Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013), using the information on the
suitability of a location for cultivating dierent types of crops collected in
the FAO's Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ 2002). In particular, we
identify the land inhabited by each of the ethnic groups in the Ethnographic
Atlas, then we use all land within 200 kilometers of an ethnic group's cen-
troid and measure the amount of land within this area that can grow each
of the cereal crops that comprise our measures of land suitability. Wheat,
barley and rye are plough-positive crops, while sorghum, foxtail millet and
pearl millet are plough-negative ones.23 So the variables `Plough-positive
crops' and `Plough-negative crops' capture the average suitability for each
type of crop, normalized by the overall suitability for cultivation in general.
When considering the relationship between land suitability and domestic
violence, we observe that having an ancestral environment that was more
suitable to cultivate plough-positive crops is associated with a higher female
acceptability of partner violence, while no signicant relationship emerges
for male attitudes towards partner violence and actual violence experiences.
When the environment was better able to cultivate plough-negative crops,
then the number of episodes in which women think violence would be accept-
able is higher, while no signicant eect is found on other domestic violence
variables.
Overall, the results in Table 5 are very consistent with our two hypothe-
ses. First, when women are more economically valuable (e.g., because men
have to pay for them and/or they are productive for the economic structure
of the family) they are less subject to intrafamily violence and this type
of violence is considered less acceptable. Second, ancestral characteristics
of society which led to a dierent economic role of women determine cul-
tural attitudes that persist even today when socioeconomic conditions have
evolved.24
22Notice that these variables are not collinear because a given area may be suitable for
plough positive crops only, plough negative only, for both types or for neither one.
23As in Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013), we assume that land suitability for dierent
types of crops provided by GAEZ is an unbiased measure of relative historical suitabil-
ity. Nunn and Qian (2011) show that there is a positive correlation between a country's
suitability for potato cultivation today and historical potato production.
24To explore the role of economic factors further, we tested whether customary inheri-
tance practices of one's ethnic group aect domestic violence. In particular, we focused on
equal transmission of land inheritance to daughters and sons, on matrilineal inheritance
and on primogeniture (as coded in the Ethnographic Atlas). None of these variables was
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Marriage patterns
We next consider another set of cultural determinants of the propensity to
violence, arising from distinct marriage patterns among ethnic groups in
pre-colonial times.
[Insert Table 6]
Panel A of Table 6 shows the impact of endogamy, i.e., the practice
of marrying within a specic social or ethnic group, on spousal violence.
We nd that being from an ethnicity that was traditionally endogamous is
positively associated with violence experienced, increasing the likelihood of
ever being victim of violence by 6:9 percentage points, a 26 percent increase
over the mean. This is accompanied by a positive and signicant eect on the
reported male acceptability of violence towards women. We can think of two
possible interpretations. One is that ethnicities which practiced endogamy
were less open to new ideas and in some respect more `backward'. The
second interpretation is that beating a wife of a dierent ethnic group may
bring about retaliation across ethnicities. The possibility of retaliation and
open conict with other ethnic groups may have acted as a deterrent to
domestic violence in societies practicing exogamy, in a similar way in which
it may deter inter-ethnic conict (Fearon and Laitin, 1996).
The second marriage arrangement we consider is the stem family, which
is a small extended family in which two generations cohabit in the same
homestead, as one son stays at the parental house with his wife and children.
Columns 3 to 6 of panel B show that where the stem family was socially
predominant in the past, both men and women tend to be less favorable to
violence. This result is consistent with the evidence from Spain provided by
Tur-Prats (2015). She argues that co-residence with another woman (the
mother-in-law) increased the productive role of the wife, since it decreased
the burden of domestic work for the latter, thus freeing up time for farming
work. The same explanation can rationalize our results.
Another widespread social institution in Sub-Saharan Africa prior to
industrialization was polygyny, a custom that allows men to have multiple
wives.25 Interestingly, there seems to be no correlation between intimate
signicantly associated with domestic violence in our sample. Results are available upon
request.
25While we do not investigate the origins of polygyny in this paper, Goody (1973) argues
that \the reasons behind polygyny are sexual and reproductive rather than economic and
productive" (ibidem, p.189). For an empirical analysis of polygyny in Africa, see Fenske
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partner violence and polygynous unions (panel C). The lack of an eect
may result from two contrasting forces. On the one hand, to the extent
that having more than one wife indicates a less progressive orientation and
a lower consideration of women's status, one would expect to see an increase
in violence associated with polygyny. On the other hand, some of the motives
that typically instigate violence against one's wife may be alleviated by the
presence of other wives. For example, if the inability of the rst wife to
deliver a son is compensated for by a second wife who delivers one, this may
reduce the husband's propensity to beat the rst wife.26
Finally, we consider the role played by customary residence patterns
upon marriage. For the majority of ethnic groups in our sample (85 percent
of respondents), traditional norms prescribe that upon marriage the couple
resides in the same village or clan territory of the husband and/or of his
family (patrilocal or virilocal residence). In panel D we nd no evidence
that virilocal residence aects domestic violence incidence or attitudes.
Types of settlements
Table 7 focuses on traditional living arrangements. We include three dum-
mies corresponding to the three dierent types of settlements prior to in-
dustrialization {nomadic, isolated and compact{ while the omitted category
is sedentary settlements.27
(2015).
26Milazzo (2014) nds that women with a rst-born daughter are signicantly more
likely to be involved in a polygynous union, compared to women with a rst-born son.
She also observes that the probability of being in a polygynous relationship when having
a rst born daughter is higher for rst-rank wives, while she nds no eect for higher rank
wives, conrming that husbands may choose to marry another woman because the rst
had a daughter.
27In Murdock's Atlas, ethnicities are grouped into dierent categories based on set-
tlements patterns: nomadic or fully migratory; seminomadic; semisedentary; compact
but impermanent settlements; neighborhoods of dispersed family homesteads; separated
hamlets forming a single community; compact and permanent settlements; and complex
settlements. Starting from this classication, we create a dummy `Nomadic' equal to one
if the traditional settlements patterns were nomadic or seminomadic, a dummy `Isolated',
equal to one when ancestral settlements were characterized by neighborhood of dispersed
family homesteads, a dummy `Compact', which refers to those ethnic groups who had
compact but impermanent settlements or compact and relatively permanent settlements,
and a dummy `Sedentary', including semisedentary settlements, neighborhoods of dis-
persed family homesteads, separated hamlets forming a single community, compact and




We nd that violence tends to be higher in nomadic communities, that
women tend to justify more husband's abuses in isolated settlements, while
men whose ancestors lived in compact settlements are less prone to justify
wife beating today. These results are consistent with several non-exclusive
interpretations. One is that nomadic and isolated settlements represent
less developed organizational patterns and that this feature correlates with
domestic violence. Another possible interpretation is that societal protection
of women is more dicult within these types of living arrangements. The
latter interpretation is consistent with the social control theory by Gelles
(1983) and Gelles and Straus (1988) since in these types of settlement social
control against violence is likely to be low.
4.4 Heterogeneous eects
In Table 4 we found that the occurence of violence (but not an attitude of ac-
ceptance) increases when women are currently employed. We next consider
whether this eect is the same for all societies or if it is larger for ethnic
groups whose women traditionally contributed less to the family income.
Underlying our hypothesis are the theories that point to the importance of
men's \breadwinner's culture" as a mediating factor in whether women's
resources are empowering or detrimental as a trigger to violence (see, e.g.,
Atkinson et al., 2005). This part of our analysis is also in the spirit of Cools
and Kotsadam's (2015) and Tur-Prats' (2016) recent empirical exercises.
We investigate the above question by estimating the following regression:
V iolenceigc = c +  Workingigc +   Ethnog +
+ Workingigc  Ethnog + Xigc + igc
where V iolenceigc is the outcome of interest for individual i from ethnicity
g in country c. As before, this is the `actual' violence dummy (or index)
when we consider violence episodes experienced by the woman, and the
violence `attitudes' dummy (or index) when we focus on women's and men's
attitudes. Workingigc is a dummy equal to one if the woman is currently
working, while Ethnog indicates the ancestral characteristic of interest of the
ethnicity g to which the individual belongs. It refers to ancestral features
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derived from Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas, which are related to gender
roles in the past and women's traditional contribution to the family income.
Xigc is a vector of individual controls and c is a vector of country xed
eects.28 Standard errors are clustered at the ethnicity level. Results are in
Table 8.
[Insert Table 8]
Each panel in the table shows the coecients of the variable `Working',
of the cultural characteristic of interest and of the interaction between these
two variables. It also displays the p-value of the test that sum of the coe-
cients of the variable `Working' and the interaction term is equal to 0, i.e.,
that b + b in (4.4). Finally, as for the other tables, we report the number
of observations, the R-squared and the mean of dependent variable in the
subsample considered. Although we only display three coecients for each
regression, we always include the individual controls listed before and coun-
try xed eects, as in equation (1).
Panel A of table 8 shows that, in societies that did not practice bride-
price in pre-colonial times, women who are currently employed are more
likely to be victims of domestic violence (b > 0). Interestingly, this eect is
strongly reduced in those societies that were characterized by brideprice in
the past: the coecient of the interaction term `Working*brideprice' (b) is
negative and signicant. A possible reason is that ancestral practices that
may have induced a higher consideration of the economic value of women
(e.g., brideprice) make women's current working status more acceptable.
When considering women's and men's attitudes towards wife beating, we
nd no signicant heterogenous eects.
In panel B we examine the role of plough agritulture. When considering
actual violence (columns 1 and 2), we observe that the coecient of the
dummy `Working' is positive and signicant, while the coecient of the in-
teraction term between `Working' and `Plough' is negative and signicant,
suggesting that violence against women increases if they work, but this eect
is not present in ethncities that used the plough. Albeit counter-intuitive,
this result might be aected by the fact that very few ethnicities used the
plough in our sample.
We next interact the variable `Working' with the overall dependence on dif-
ferent production activities in ancestral societies. In general, the interaction
28Xigc includes woman's and partner's age and years of education, the number of chil-
dren ever born and the household size, a wealth index, a dummy for urban residence and
a set of religion dummies.
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term is insignicant in panels C to H, with the exception of panel E, where
we consider society's dependence from gathering. While female employment
is associated with higher probability and intensity of violence in societies
that did not rely on gathering (b > 0 in columns 1-2), in ancestral reliance
on gathering reverses this eect (b < 0). Recall that gathering is the activ-
ity with traditionally the highest share of female labor force participation
(see Table 3). Then this result again suggests that familiarity with women's
productive role in pre-colonial times reduces possible intra-family tensions
associated with women's work.
Finally, in panels I to L we interact the variable `Working' with some fea-
tures related to marriage patterns in pre-colonial times. The only signicant
heterogeneous eects are found for polygyny (panel K). In non-polygynous
societies, working status of the woman is associated with less acceptability
of domestic violence (b < 0), while in polygynous ones this negative eect
is mitigated (b > 0).
5 Robustness checks
We test the robustness of our results along several dimensions. First we
experiment with dierent estimation methods for (1). In Appendix Tables
A.4 to A.6 we alternatively use a Probit model when the outcome is a dummy
variable (corresponding to columns 1, 3 and 5 of the tables) and a Poisson
model when the dependent variable is a count variable (i.e., in the case of the
violence indices used in columns 2, 4 and 6). For Probit estimates we report
marginal eects, while for Poisson models we report incidence-rate ratios,
meaning that all coecients presented in the tables are `exponentiated' (for
example, we report exp(b) rather than the estimated coecient b). The
results in Appendix Tables A.4 to A.6 conrm the OLS results in Tables 5
to 7.
The second robustness check relates to the dierent samples used for the
analysis of actual violence levels (columns 1-2 in the previous tables) and
attitudes towards violence (columns 3 to 6). Due to the fact that the survey
module on experience of domestic violence was not administered in all DHS
countries, our sample for these regressions is smaller than for the attitude
regressions. As a robustness check, we therefore re-estimate the impact
of historical and cultural legacies on women's and men's attitudes towards
spousal violence, restricting the sample to the 18 African countries for which
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the domestic violence module is available.29 By doing so, we are able to test
whether our previous results were driven by the larger number of countries
for which information on acceptance of violence as a practice is collected.
The results, reported in Appendix Tables A.7 to A.9, are very similar to
the ones we reported in the main tables. Here we point out only a few
dierences. First, we nd no evidence of a correlation between dependence
on hunting and the likelihood that a woman justies husband's aggression.
Second, we no longer nd evidence of a relationship between stem family
and acceptability of domestic violence. Third, concerning polygyny, when
we consider the restricted sample we observe that the number of episodes
in which women think violence would be acceptable is lower. Fourth, we
nd that men whose ancestors lived in nomadic settlements are more likely
to justify spousal violence, while this impact was not found in the extended
sample. This is consistent with the view that in nomadic environments social
protection of women is likely to be lower. Despite these minor dierences,
our results are largely robust to dierent denitions of the sample.
Finally, we re-estimated the association between pre-colonial features of
society and contemporary violence excluding female employment and num-
ber of births from the set of controls, as these are potentially endogenous
variables. Our results were essentially unaected.30
6 Conclusions
We have investigated the role of individual characteristics as well as ancestral
features of individuals' ethnic groups in explaining domestic violence in the
African continent. Our conclusions can be summarized in two points.
First, ancient socioeconomic conditions shape social norms about gender
roles, family structures and intrafamily violence which persist over time
even when the initial conditions change. We have shown how norms about
marriage patterns, living arrangements and the productive role of women in
ancient times are associated with violence experienced by women and with
attitudes towards violence within the family today.
29The DHS survey rounds in the respective countries are: BF6(Burkina Faso,
2010), CD6(Congo Democratic Republic, 2013-2014), CI6(Cote d'Ivoire, 2011-2012),
CM6(Cameroon,2011), GA6(Gabon, 2012), GH5(Ghana, 2008), KE5(Kenya, 2008-2009),
ML5(Mali, 2006), MW5(Malawi, 2006), MZ6(Mozambique, 2011), NG6(Nigeria, 2013),
NM6(Namibia, 2013), RW6(Rwanda, 2010), SL6(Sierra Leone, 2013), TG6(Togo, 2013-
2014), UG6(Uganda, 2011), ZM5(Zambia, 2013-2014), ZW6(Zimbabwe, 2010-2011).
30Results are available upon request.
25
Second, we have focused on how women's economic role may aect vi-
olence and found a complex pattern of relationships. On the one hand, in
societies where in pre-colonial times women had an active economic role
and/or a brideprice was paid upon marriage, men are less prone to vio-
lence even today, given the nature of gender roles determined by these past
arrangements. On the other hand, we nd increases in domestic violence for
couples where the woman is currently economically active and independent,
i.e., where she may have more bargaining power within the family and pose
a threat to the husband. All these results are consistent with the hypothesis
of long term persistence of gender norms.
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Table 1: Matching DHS ethnicities to Ethnographic Atlas
Number Percentage Number Percentage
observations observations ethnicities ethnicities
Direct 174129 32.94 130 18.13
Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) 57453 10.87 47 6.56
Ethnologue 75310 14.25 88 12.27
Joshua Project 2850 0.54 10 1.40
Wikipedia 42301 8.00 21 2.93
Two sources 34262 6.48 13 1.81
Other source 497 0.09 6 0.84
Not matched 141813 26.83 402 56.07
Table 2: Summary statistics violence measures - attitudes & actual violence
Women Men
Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N
Attitudes towards violence
Violence attitude 0.462 0.499 255242 0.338 0.473 115013
Violence attitude index 1.306 1.76 246053 0.76 1.337 112260
Violence justied if the wife:
Goes out without telling 0.299 0.458 258972 0.179 0.384 117668
Neglects the children 0.326 0.469 259716 0.21 0.408 117889
Argues with the husband 0.301 0.459 252395 0.187 0.39 114293
Refuses to have sex 0.237 0.425 256827 0.114 0.318 117093
Burns the food 0.161 0.368 252843 0.083 0.275 114537
Actual violence experienced
Violence ever 0.285 0.452 77821 - - -
Violence index ever 0.63 1.235 77683 - - -
Violence last year 0.215 0.411 77719 - - -
Violence index last year 0.461 1.083 77683 - - -
Notes: Source: Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas and Demographic and Health Survey
(DHS). Survey weights are always included. Concerning violence attitudes, all DHS
African countries with data on domestic violence attitudes are considered. There are
28 countries for the female sample and 27 countries for the male sample. Concerning ac-
tual violence, countries with the violence module are considered. The sample is composed
by women selected and interviewed for the domestic violence module. Overall, 18 African
countries are included.
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Table 3: Summary statistics ancestral characteristics
Women
Mean Std. Dev. N
Ethnographic variables
Plough 0.063 0.243 259651
Agriculture main source 0.965 0.184 266361
Dependence on agriculture 0.618 0.123 266361
Dependence on gathering 0.064 0.046 266361
Dependence on hunting 0.09 0.061 266361
Dependence on shing 0.087 0.068 266361
Dependence on husbandry 0.194 0.113 266361
Female participation agriculture 0.671 0.47 230396
Female participation gathering 0.866 0.341 117603
Female participation shing 0.176 0.38 147649
Female participation husbandry 0.454 0.498 168421
Brideprice 0.921 0.269 265612
Endogamy 0.221 0.415 249919
Stem family 0.248 0.432 264000
Polygyny 0.973 0.161 262236
Virilocality 0.846 0.36 264917
Sedentary 0.984 0.126 259283
Nomadic 0.016 0.126 259283
Compact 0.548 0.498 259283
Isolated 0.154 0.361 259283
Gender equal land inheritance 0.046 0.209 244914
Matrilineal land inheritance 0.142 0.349 244914
Primogeniture land inheritance 0.629 0.483 232667
Notes: Source: Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas and Demographic and Health Survey
(DHS). Survey weights are always included. All DHS African countries with data on
women's attitudes towards domestic violence are considered. Overall there are 28 coun-
tries in the sample.
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Table 4: Contemporaneous correlates
Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
violence violence attitude attitude attitude attitude
ever index dummy index dummy index
Age -0.002** -0.003 -0.004*** -0.015*** -0.004*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Education (years) -0.001 -0.003 -0.011*** -0.039*** -0.008*** -0.025***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
Wealth index -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.018** -0.005*** -0.020***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.005)
Working 0.043*** 0.117*** -0.005 -0.038 -0.014 -0.035
(0.010) (0.026) (0.009) (0.033) (0.016) (0.062)
Number of births 0.012*** 0.031*** 0.007*** 0.030*** 0.005*** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.008) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.004)
Household size 0.002** 0.003 0.002** 0.006 0.001 0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003)
Partner's age -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.000 0.002 -0.002*** -0.005***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Partner's education -0.001 -0.005* -0.003*** -0.010*** -0.005*** -0.013***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Urban 0.037*** 0.086*** -0.061*** -0.289*** -0.027*** -0.123***
(0.010) (0.029) (0.011) (0.045) (0.008) (0.028)
Constant 0.123*** 0.216*** 0.281*** 0.845*** 0.231** -0.057
(0.028) (0.063) (0.026) (0.102) (0.095) (0.428)
Observations 68,224 68,119 156,869 152,374 49,351 48,483
R-squared 0.119 0.100 0.226 0.245 0.150 0.136
Mean dep. var 0.272 0.578 0.479 1.413 0.313 0.721
Notes: OLS estimates. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the ethnicity level. ***,
** and * indicate signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Column headings
indicate the dependent variable considered. The bottom line reports the mean of the
dependent variable. Coecients and standard errors of the variable Wealth index are
multiplied by 100000. Controls include country xed eects and religion dummies. Sample
coverage: for actual violence (cols. 1-2) all 18 African countries with domestic violence
module are included; for violence attitudes (cols. 3-6) there are 28 African countries for
the female sample and 27 for the male one.
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Table 5: Cultural correlates - economic value of women
Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
violence violence attitude attitude attitude attitude
ever index dummy index dummy index
A. Brideprice -0.115** -0.354*** -0.008 -0.009 -0.061*** -0.147*
(0.049) (0.130) (0.029) (0.105) (0.020) (0.075)
Observations 67,996 67,892 156,391 151,909 49,210 48,343
R-squared 0.122 0.104 0.226 0.245 0.152 0.137
Mean dep. var 0.271 0.576 0.478 1.410 0.312 0.720
B. Plough 0.132*** 0.344** 0.006 -0.274 -0.023 -0.295
(0.035) (0.146) (0.050) (0.254) (0.087) (0.334)
Observations 66,030 65,926 153,111 148,728 48,307 47,448
R-squared 0.123 0.102 0.226 0.243 0.152 0.137
Mean dep. var 0.270 0.576 0.483 1.426 0.314 0.725
C. Agriculture main source -0.037 -0.007 -0.030 -0.183* -0.022 -0.117
(0.035) (0.091) (0.025) (0.100) (0.035) (0.095)
Observations 68,224 68,119 156,869 152,374 49,351 48,483
R-squared 0.119 0.100 0.226 0.245 0.150 0.136
Mean dep. var 0.272 0.578 0.479 1.413 0.313 0.721
D. Dependence on agriculture -0.068 -0.116 0.056 0.053 0.049 0.078
(0.068) (0.189) (0.059) (0.205) (0.055) (0.154)
Observations 68,224 68,119 156,869 152,374 49,351 48,483
R-squared 0.119 0.100 0.226 0.245 0.151 0.136
Mean dep. var 0.272 0.578 0.479 1.413 0.313 0.721
E. Dependence on gathering -0.346* -0.957** -0.082 -0.012 -0.120 0.110
(0.195) (0.479) (0.167) (0.653) (0.177) (0.506)
Observations 68,224 68,119 156,869 152,374 49,351 48,483
R-squared 0.120 0.100 0.226 0.245 0.151 0.136
Mean dep. var 0.272 0.578 0.479 1.413 0.313 0.721
F. Dependence on hunting 0.319 0.773 0.292** 0.782 0.051 0.209
(0.242) (0.686) (0.143) (0.576) (0.196) (0.535)
Observations 68,224 68,119 156,869 152,374 49,351 48,483
R-squared 0.119 0.100 0.226 0.245 0.150 0.136
Mean dep. var 0.272 0.578 0.479 1.413 0.313 0.721
G. Dependence on shing 0.227** 0.536** -0.135 -0.416 0.047 -0.029
(0.093) (0.248) (0.099) (0.360) (0.075) (0.213)
Observations 68,224 68,119 156,869 152,374 49,351 48,483
R-squared 0.120 0.100 0.226 0.245 0.150 0.136
Mean dep. var 0.272 0.578 0.479 1.413 0.313 0.721
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Table 5: Cultural correlates - economic value of women (CONTINUED)
Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
violence violence attitude attitude attitude attitude
ever index dummy index dummy index
H. Dependence on husbandry -0.041 -0.147 -0.038 0.056 -0.084 -0.158
(0.086) (0.218) (0.062) (0.248) (0.063) (0.183)
Observations 68,224 68,119 156,869 152,374 49,351 48,483
R-squared 0.119 0.100 0.226 0.245 0.151 0.136
Mean dep. var 0.272 0.578 0.479 1.413 0.313 0.721
I. Plough-positive crops 0.022 0.057 0.184*** 0.796*** 0.079 0.273
(0.060) (0.153) (0.064) (0.250) (0.071) (0.214)
Plough-negative crops 0.052 0.113 0.068 0.397** -0.004 0.065
(0.094) (0.258) (0.042) (0.166) (0.055) (0.152)
Observations 66,288 66,193 153,080 148,872 48,117 47,290
R-squared 0.118 0.099 0.229 0.248 0.151 0.137
Mean dep. var 0.268 0.568 0.479 1.420 0.313 0.724
Equality of coecients (p-value) 0.800 0.867 0.075 0.057 0.352 0.403
Notes: OLS estimates. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the ethnicity level.
***, ** and * indicate signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Column
headings indicate the dependent variable considered. The bottom line reports the mean of
the dependent variable. Controls include: age, education (years), wealth index, working
dummy, number of births, household size, partner's age and education, urban status,
religion dummies and country xed eects. Sample coverage: for actual violence (cols.
1-2) all 18 African countries with domestic violence module are included; for violence
attitudes (cols. 3-6) there are 28 African countries for the female sample and 27 for the
male one.
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Table 6: Cultural correlates - marriage patterns
Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
violence violence attitude attitude attitude attitude
ever index dummy index dummy index
A. Endogamy 0.069*** 0.188*** -0.014 0.004 0.033* 0.113*
(0.023) (0.066) (0.019) (0.087) (0.019) (0.062)
Observations 64,313 64,223 147,292 142,932 46,072 45,231
R-squared 0.120 0.101 0.234 0.251 0.157 0.141
Mean dep. var 0.266 0.562 0.478 1.419 0.311 0.719
B. Stem family -0.022 -0.061 -0.035* -0.160** -0.011 -0.074*
(0.020) (0.049) (0.020) (0.078) (0.017) (0.041)
Observations 68,054 67,949 155,899 152,070 49,090 48,388
R-squared 0.119 0.100 0.223 0.246 0.146 0.136
Mean dep. var 0.272 0.577 0.478 1.416 0.311 0.722
C. Polygyny -0.009 -0.059 -0.006 0.051 0.037 0.259
(0.015) (0.053) (0.025) (0.196) (0.055) (0.196)
Observations 67,710 67,605 154,966 151,153 48,433 47,737
R-squared 0.119 0.100 0.224 0.246 0.148 0.138
Mean dep. var 0.272 0.578 0.477 1.416 0.311 0.724
D. Virilocality 0.010 0.054 0.006 0.079 -0.016 -0.003
(0.018) (0.056) (0.027) (0.099) (0.022) (0.064)
Observations 67,856 67,751 156,167 151,690 48,853 47,991
R-squared 0.119 0.100 0.226 0.245 0.152 0.138
Mean dep. var 0.272 0.578 0.479 1.412 0.313 0.722
Notes: OLS estimates. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the ethnicity level.
***, ** and * indicate signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Column
headings indicate the dependent variable considered. The bottom line reports the mean of
the dependent variable. Controls include: age, education (years), wealth index, working
dummy, number of births, household size, partner's age and education, urban status,
religion dummies and country xed eects. Sample coverage: for actual violence (cols.
1-2) all 18 African countries with domestic violence module are included; for violence
attitudes (cols. 3-6) there are 28 African countries for the female sample and 27 for the
male one.
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Table 7: Cultural correlates - types of settlements
Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
violence violence attitude attitude attitude attitude
ever index dummy index dummy index
Settlements types
Nomadic 0.077* 0.068 -0.018 0.030 -0.017 0.037
(0.043) (0.113) (0.031) (0.128) (0.033) (0.100)
Isolated 0.046 0.127 0.059* 0.281** -0.026 0.006
(0.035) (0.096) (0.032) (0.137) (0.031) (0.102)
Compact 0.000 -0.001 -0.020 -0.038 -0.048*** -0.114**
(0.017) (0.041) (0.027) (0.094) (0.014) (0.049)
Observations 65,850 65,746 152,904 148,521 48,251 47,393
R-squared 0.123 0.103 0.227 0.244 0.153 0.137
Mean dep. var 0.270 0.577 0.483 1.428 0.314 0.725
Notes: OLS estimates. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the ethnicity level.
***, ** and * indicate signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The omitted
category is sedentary settlements. Column headings indicate the dependent variable con-
sidered. The bottom line reports the mean of the dependent variable. Controls include:
age, education (years), wealth index, working dummy, number of births, household size,
partner's age and education, urban status, religion dummies and country xed eects.
Sample coverage: for actual violence (cols. 1-2) all 18 African countries with domestic vi-
olence module are included; for violence attitudes (cols. 3-6) there are 28 African countries
for the female sample and 27 for the male one.
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Table 8: Contemporaneous women employment - heterogenous eects
Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
violence violence attitude attitude attitude attitude
ever index dummy index dummy index
A. Brideprice -0.052 -0.202* 0.015 0.122 -0.037 -0.061
(0.046) (0.110) (0.032) (0.088) (0.039) (0.103)
Working 0.138*** 0.344*** 0.031 0.164 0.008 0.044
(0.030) (0.052) (0.031) (0.121) (0.047) (0.135)
Working*brideprice -0.100*** -0.238*** -0.040 -0.222* -0.026 -0.093
(0.032) (0.059) (0.032) (0.126) (0.050) (0.150)
Test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.319 0.087 0.299 0.482
Observations 67,996 67,892 156,391 151,909 49,210 48,343
R-squared 0.122 0.104 0.226 0.245 0.152 0.137
Mean dep. var 0.271 0.576 0.478 1.410 0.312 0.720
B. Plough 0.203*** 0.529*** 0.021 -0.277 -0.036 -0.326
(0.057) (0.179) (0.053) (0.259) (0.083) (0.318)
Working 0.042*** 0.119*** -0.002 -0.033 -0.018 -0.045
(0.010) (0.027) (0.009) (0.036) (0.018) (0.076)
Working*plough -0.097** -0.252** -0.028** 0.007 0.015 0.036
(0.042) (0.101) (0.014) (0.048) (0.036) (0.109)
Test (p-value) 0.187 0.171 0.004 0.460 0.905 0.905
Observations 66,030 65,926 153,111 148,728 48,307 47,448
R-squared 0.123 0.102 0.226 0.243 0.152 0.137
Mean dep. var 0.270 0.576 0.483 1.426 0.314 0.725
C. Agriculture main source -0.034 0.036 -0.029 -0.210** -0.017 -0.010
(0.043) (0.093) (0.020) (0.086) (0.044) (0.121)
Working 0.050 0.204** -0.004 -0.105 -0.009 0.082
(0.044) (0.103) (0.029) (0.093) (0.029) (0.058)
Working*agriculture main source -0.007 -0.088 -0.001 0.070 -0.006 -0.122
(0.045) (0.104) (0.030) (0.099) (0.033) (0.086)
Test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.568 0.314 0.390 0.535
Observations 68,224 68,119 156,869 152,374 49,351 48,483
R-squared 0.119 0.100 0.226 0.245 0.150 6 0.136
Mean dep. var 0.272 0.578 0.479 1.413 0.313 0.721
D. Dependence on agriculture -0.084 -0.130 0.034 -0.088 0.122 0.568
(0.071) (0.196) (0.054) (0.208) (0.100) (0.396)
Working 0.029 0.106 -0.027 -0.175 0.030 0.266
(0.038) (0.097) (0.038) (0.126) (0.054) (0.186)
Working*dependence on agriculture 0.023 0.020 0.035 0.223 -0.078 -0.527
(0.060) (0.157) (0.064) (0.210) (0.102) (0.399)
Test (p-value) 0.046 0.071 0.790 0.615 0.357 0.236
Observations 68,224 68,119 156,869 152,374 49,351 48,483
R-squared 0.119 0.100 0.226 0.245 0.151 0.136
Mean dep. var 0.272 0.578 0.479 1.413 0.313 0.721
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Table 8: Contemporaneous women employment - heterogenous eects (CONTINUED)
Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
violence violence attitude attitude attitude attitude
ever index dummy index dummy index
E. Dependence on gathering -0.052 -0.228 -0.030 0.257 -0.096 0.492
(0.178) (0.441) (0.188) (0.720) (0.336) (1.112)
Working 0.073*** 0.192*** 0.000 -0.011 -0.013 -0.007
(0.014) (0.034) (0.009) (0.040) (0.027) (0.063)
Working*dependence on gathering -0.423** -1.050** -0.080 -0.408 -0.025 -0.400
(0.169) (0.439) (0.141) (0.600) (0.360) (1.227)
Test (p-value) 0.029 0.039 0.557 0.466 0.911 0.731
Observations 68,224 68,119 156,869 152,374 49,351 48,483
R-squared 0.120 0.101 0.226 0.245 0.151 0.136
Mean dep. var 0.272 0.578 0.479 1.413 0.313 0.721
F. Dependence on hunting 0.323 0.712 0.298* 0.616 -0.330 -1.206
(0.239) (0.672) (0.167) (0.609) (0.263) (0.943)
Working 0.043** 0.109** -0.005 -0.061 -0.052* -0.175
(0.020) (0.053) (0.018) (0.058) (0.030) (0.130)
Working*dependence on hunting -0.006 0.086 -0.009 0.238 0.403 1.496
(0.167) (0.440) (0.152) (0.486) (0.300) (0.938)
Test (p-value) 0.804 0.621 0.919 0.687 0.204 0.107
Observations 68,224 68,119 156,869 152,374 49,351 48,483
R-squared 0.119 0.100 0.226 0.245 0.151 0.136
Mean dep. var 0.272 0.578 0.479 1.413 0.313 0.721
G. Dependence on shing 0.212** 0.611** -0.178 -0.536 -0.085 -0.962
(0.106) (0.291) (0.118) (0.465) (0.206) (0.851)
Working 0.041** 0.124** -0.010 -0.052 -0.027 -0.120
(0.016) (0.049) (0.014) (0.054) (0.032) (0.137)
Working*dependence on shing 0.021 -0.104 0.062 0.175 0.139 0.980
(0.121) (0.341) (0.105) (0.429) (0.230) (0.956)
Test (p-value) 0.569 0.947 0.582 0.752 0.576 0.298
Observations 68,224 68,119 156,869 152,374 49,351 48,483
R-squared 0.120 0.100 0.226 0.245 0.150 0.136
Mean dep. var 0.272 0.578 0.479 1.413 0.313 0.721
H. Dependence on husbandry -0.056 -0.236 -0.016 0.180 -0.024 -0.085
(0.075) (0.183) (0.054) (0.231) (0.079) (0.223)
Working 0.038** 0.085** 0.004 0.014 0.000 -0.018
(0.015) (0.037) (0.014) (0.054) (0.022) (0.083)
Working*dependence on husbandry 0.028 0.172 -0.048 -0.269 -0.068 -0.082
(0.079) (0.214) (0.052) (0.191) (0.062) (0.201)
Test (p-value) 0.341 0.174 0.295 0.093 0.175 0.526
Observations 68,224 68,119 156,869 152,374 49,351 48,483
R-squared 0.119 0.100 0.226 0.245 0.151 0.136
Mean dep. var 0.272 0.578 0.479 1.413 0.313 0.721
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Table 8: Contemporaneous women employment - heterogenous eects (CONTINUED)
Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
violence violence attitude attitude attitude attitude
ever index dummy index dummy index
I. Endogamy 0.054*** 0.156*** -0.027 -0.061 0.003 0.032
(0.020) (0.056) (0.020) (0.091) (0.029) (0.098)
Working 0.035*** 0.099*** -0.010 -0.061 -0.026 -0.066
(0.010) (0.029) (0.010) (0.037) (0.022) (0.089)
Working*endogamy 0.023 0.049 0.022 0.104 0.032 0.088
(0.016) (0.049) (0.016) (0.069) (0.028) (0.095)
Test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.365 0.480 0.719 0.570
Observations 64,313 64,223 147,292 142,932 46,072 45,231
R-squared 0.120 0.102 0.234 0.251 0.157 0.141
Mean dep. var 0.266 0.562 0.478 1.419 0.311 0.719
J. Stem family -0.013 -0.024 -0.023 -0.137 0.056 0.243
(0.017) (0.046) (0.023) (0.088) (0.038) (0.183)
Working 0.046*** 0.131*** -0.001 -0.033 -0.001 0.029
(0.010) (0.027) (0.009) (0.039) (0.015) (0.037)
Working*stem family -0.013 -0.055 -0.019 -0.038 -0.071* -0.333*
(0.022) (0.055) (0.021) (0.077) (0.042) (0.195)
Test (p-value) 0.0810 0.1016 0.2961 0.2807 0.0693 0.1152
Observations 68,054 67,949 155,899 152,070 49,090 48,388
R-squared 0.119 0.100 0.224 0.246 0.146 0.137
Mean dep. var 0.272 0.577 0.478 1.416 0.311 0.722
K. Polygyny -0.022 -0.072 -0.017 0.051 -0.014 0.128
(0.015) (0.045) (0.027) (0.192) (0.058) (0.209)
Working 0.014 0.086** -0.035*** -0.036 -0.066*** -0.172***
(0.013) (0.041) (0.006) (0.024) (0.006) (0.015)
Working*polygyny 0.030** 0.031 0.031*** -0.002 0.058*** 0.152**
(0.015) (0.046) (0.010) (0.040) (0.018) (0.068)
Test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.634 0.263 0.638 0.767
Observations 67,710 67,605 154,966 151,153 48,433 47,737
R-squared 0.119 0.100 0.224 0.246 0.148 0.138
Mean dep. var 0.272 0.578 0.477 1.416 0.311 0.724
L. Virilocality 0.018 0.046 0.011 0.096 -0.015 -0.006
(0.020) (0.052) (0.029) (0.102) (0.028) (0.100)
Working 0.053*** 0.106*** 0.001 -0.015 -0.013 -0.038
(0.018) (0.034) (0.016) (0.060) (0.026) (0.078)
Working*Virilocality -0.012 0.013 -0.007 -0.027 -0.002 0.004
(0.021) (0.046) (0.019) (0.074) (0.031) (0.104)
Test (p-value) 0.001 0.002 0.518 0.260 0.432 0.625
Observations 67,856 67,751 156,167 151,690 48,853 47,991
R-squared 0.119 0.100 0.226 0.245 0.152 0.138
Mean dep. var 0.272 0.578 0.479 1.412 0.313 0.722
Notes: OLS estimates. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the ethnicity level. ***,
** and * indicate signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Column headings
indicate the dependent variable considered. The bottom line reports the mean of the
dependent variable. The p-value of the test that sum of the coecients of the variable
Working and the interaction term is equal to 0 is also reported. Controls include: age,
education (years), wealth index, working dummy, number of births, household size, part-
ner's age and education, urban status, religion dummies and country xed eects. Sample
coverage: for actual violence (cols. 1-2) all 18 African countries with domestic violence
module are included; for violence attitudes (cols. 3-6) there are 28 African countries for
the female sample and 27 for the male one.
Appendix
A1 Additional tables




Violence index ever DHS
Violence attitude dummy (women) DHS
Violence attitude index (women) DHS
Violence attitude dummy (men) DHS
Violence attitude index (men) DHS
Ethnographic variables
Plough Ethnographic Atlas
Agriculture main source Ethnographic Atlas
Dependence on agriculture Ethnographic Atlas
Dependence on gathering Ethnographic Atlas
Dependence on hunting Ethnographic Atlas
Dependence on shing Ethnographic Atlas
Dependence on husbandry Ethnographic Atlas
Brideprice Ethnographic Atlas
Endogamy Ethnographic Atlas






Gender equal land inheritance Ethnographic Atlas
Matrilineal land inheritance Ethnographic Atlas













Notes: A detailed description of how dependent and independent variables have been
constructed is provided in Section A2 and Section A3 of the Appendix, respectively.
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Table A.2: Summary statistics
Mean Std. Dev. N
Ethnographic variables
Plough 0.002 0.042 92835
Agriculture main source 0.986 0.116 96077
Dependence on agriculture 0.638 0.13 96077
Dependence on gathering 0.065 0.048 96077
Dependence on hunting 0.089 0.059 96077
Dependence on shing 0.086 0.073 96077
Dependence on husbandry 0.177 0.1 96077
Female participation agriculture 0.704 0.456 82467
Female participation gathering 0.903 0.297 42992
Female participation hunting 0 0 61663
Female participation shing 0.16 0.367 50771
Female participation husbandry 0.398 0.489 59416
Brideprice 0.947 0.224 95769
Endogamy 0.197 0.398 90290
Stem family 0.27 0.444 95788
Polygyny 0.994 0.075 95275
Virilocality 0.843 0.364 95538
Sedentary 0.989 0.105 92553
Nomadic 0.011 0.105 92553
Compact 0.531 0.499 92553
Isolated 0.189 0.391 92553
Gender equal land inheritance 0.042 0.201 87962
Matrilineal land inheritance 0.139 0.346 87962
Primogeniture land inheritance 0.638 0.481 84386
Notes: Source: Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas and Demographic and Health Survey
(DHS). Countries with the violence module are considered. The sample is composed by
women selected and interviewed for domestic violence module. Overall, 18 African
countries are considered.
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Table A.3: Summary statistics (controls)
Women Men
Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N
Attitudes towards violence
Age 28.438 9.425 266361 30.397 11.625 120099
Education (years) 4.873 4.632 266242 6.62 4.776 120014
Wealth index 0.183 2.074 266361 0.23 2.063 120099
Working 0.575 0.494 265785 0.776 0.417 119900
Number of births 2.857 2.767 266361 2.55 3.552 119932
Household size 6.885 4.302 266361 6.307 4.147 120099
Partner's age 39.731 11.616 174184 30.424 8.081 51291
Partner's education 5.327 5.221 191533 4.275 4.512 51272
Urban 0.384 0.486 266361 0.402 0.49 120099
Actual violence experienced
Age 29.095 9.075 96077 - - -
Education (years) 5.208 4.75 96033 - - -
Wealth index 0.057 1.87 96077 - - -
Working 0.629 0.483 95840 - - -
Number of births 3.011 2.662 96077 - - -
Household size 5.569 2.921 96077 - - -
Partner's age 38.927 11.21 69873 - - -
Partner's education 5.939 5.245 76080 - - -
Urban 0.367 0.482 96077 - - -
Notes: Source: Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas and Demographic and Health Survey
(DHS). Descriptive statistics for the variable Wealth index have been obtained by divid-
ing the wealth index factor score by 100000. Survey weights are always included. Sample
coverage: for violence attitudes there are 28 African countries for the female sample and
27 for the male one; for actual violence all 18 African countries with domestic violence
module are included.
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Table A.4: Cultural correlates - economic value of women (Probit & Poisson estimates)
Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
violence violence attitude attitude attitude attitude
ever index dummy index dummy index
A. Brideprice -0.099** 0.637*** -0.008 0.993 -0.059*** 0.841*
(0.038) (0.098) (0.031) (0.078) (0.020) (0.083)
Observations 67,996 67,892 153,849 151,909 48,636 48,343
Pseudo R-squared 0.110 0.170 0.108
Mean dep. var. 0.271 0.576 0.470 1.410 0.304 0.720
B. Plough 0.097*** 1.214* 0.006 0.868 -0.014 0.813
(0.025) (0.131) (0.048) (0.092) (0.066) (0.180)
Observations 66,030 65,926 150,569 148,728 47,733 47,448
Pseudo R-squared 0.111 0.170 0.109
Mean dep. var. 0.270 0.576 0.474 1.410 0.305 0.725
C. Agriculture main source -0.045 0.914 -0.027 0.941 -0.023 0.883
(0.031) (0.139) (0.023) (0.047) (0.032) (0.096)
Observations 68,224 68,119 154,327 152,374 48,777 48,483
Pseudo R-squared 0.107 0.170 0.107
Mean dep. var. 0.272 0.578 0.470 1.413 0.305 0.721
D. Dependence on agriculture -0.066 0.769 0.069 1.088 0.052 1.112
(0.066) (0.265) (0.061) (0.170) (0.055) (0.217)
Observations 68,224 68,119 154,327 152,374 48,777 48,483
Pseudo R-squared 0.107 0.170 0.107
Mean dep. var. 0.272 0.578 0.470 1.413 0.305 0.721
E. Dependence on gathering -0.367* 0.146* -0.105 1.070 -0.114 1.275
(0.204) (0.144) (0.173) (0.451) (0.173) (0.784)
Observations 68,224 68,119 154,327 152,374 48,777 48,483
Pseudo R-squared 0.108 0.170 0.107
Mean dep. var. 0.272 0.578 0.470 1.413 0.305 0.721
F. Dependence on hunting 0.301 3.552 0.338** 2.115 0.040 1.298
(0.239) (4.595) (0.151) (1.188) (0.213) (1.165)
Observations 68,224 68,119 154,327 152,374 48,777 48,483
Pseudo R-squared 0.108 0.170 0.107
Mean dep. var. 0.272 0.578 0.470 1.413 0.305 0.721
G. Dependence on shing 0.240*** 3.011** -0.135 0.754 0.042 0.936
(0.091) (1.350) (0.100) (0.196) (0.077) (0.277)
Observations 68,224 68,119 154,327 152,374 48,777 48,483
Pseudo R-squared 0.108 0.170 0.107
Mean dep. var. 0.272 0.578 0.470 1.413 0.305 0.721
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Table A.4: Cultural correlates - economic value of women (Probit & Poisson estimates) - CONTINUED
Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
violence violence attitude attitude attitude attitude
ever index dummy index dummy index
H. Dependence on husbandry -0.044 0.769 -0.055 0.947 -0.076 0.829
(0.084) (0.332) (0.060) (0.139) (0.057) (0.170)
Observations 68,224 68,119 154,327 152,374 48,777 48,483
Pseudo R-squared 0.107 0.170 0.108
Mean dep. var. 0.272 0.578 0.470 1.413 0.305 0.721
I. Plough-positive crops 0.006 0.996 0.201*** 1.973*** 0.081 1.477
(0.048) (0.201) (0.072) (0.400) (0.067) (0.393)
Plough-negative crops 0.032 1.143 0.084 1.346*** -0.012 1.086
(0.077) (0.380) (0.052) (0.148) (0.061) (0.250)
Observations 66,288 66,193 150,755 148,872 47,552 47,290
Pseudo R-squared 0.107 0.172 0.108
Mean dep. var. 0.268 0.568 0.471 1.420 0.305 0.724
Equality of coecients (p-value) 0.769 0.719 0.111 0.044 0.314 0.402
Notes: Columns (1), (3) and (5) report probit estimates (marginal eects reported), while
columns (2), (4) and (6) report poisson estimates (incidence-rate ratios reported, mean-
ing that coecients are exponentiated). Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the
ethnicity level. ***, ** and * indicate signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Column headings indicate the dependent variable considered. The bottom line reports the
mean of the dependent variable. Controls include: age, education (years), wealth index,
working dummy, number of births, household size, partner's age and education, urban
status, religion dummies and country xed eects. Sample coverage: for actual violence
(cols. 1-2) all 18 African countries with domestic violence module are included; for vio-
lence attitudes (cols. 3-6) there are 28 African countries for the female sample and 27 for
the male one.
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Table A.5: Cultural correlates - marriage patterns (Probit & Poisson)
Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
violence violence attitude attitude attitude attitude
ever index dummy index dummy index
A. Endogamy 0.059*** 1.298*** -0.014 0.996 0.032* 1.141*
(0.021) (0.122) (0.018) (0.052) (0.018) (0.084)
Observations 64,313 64,223 144,750 142,932 45,498 45,231
Pseudo R-squared 0.108 0.175 0.112
Mean dep. var. 0.266 0.562 0.469 1.413 0.303 0.719
B. Stem family -0.031 0.844 -0.034* 0.906* -0.009 0.923
(0.027) (0.134) (0.018) (0.051) (0.016) (0.061)
Observations 68,054 67,949 154,022 152,070 48,682 48,388
Pseudo R-squared 0.108 0.170 0.107
Mean dep. var. 0.272 0.577 0.471 1.416 0.305 0.722
C. Polygyny -0.004 0.911 0.003 1.105 0.031 1.256
(0.014) (0.074) (0.028) (0.093) (0.045) (0.180)
Observations 67,710 67,605 153,089 151,153 48,025 47,737
Pseudo R-squared 0.107 0.170 0.109
Mean dep. var. 0.272 0.578 0.471 1.416 0.306 0.724
D. Virilocality 0.008 1.094 0.005 0.973 -0.022 0.939
(0.016) (0.092) (0.032) (0.097) (0.025) (0.091)
Observations 67,856 67,751 153,625 151,690 48,279 47,991
Pseudo R-squared 0.107 0.170 0.109
Mean dep. var. 0.272 0.578 0.470 1.412 0.305 0.722
Notes: Columns (1), (3) and (5) report probit estimates (marginal eects reported), while
columns (2), (4) and (6) report poisson estimates (incidence-rate ratios reported, mean-
ing that coecients are exponentiated). Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the
ethnicity level. ***, ** and * indicate signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Column headings indicate the dependent variable considered. The bottom line reports the
mean of the dependent variable. Controls include: age, education (years), wealth index,
working dummy, number of births, household size, partner's age and education, urban
status, religion dummies and country xed eects. Sample coverage: for actual violence
(cols. 1-2) all 18 African countries with domestic violence module are included; for vio-
lence attitudes (cols. 3-6) there are 28 African countries for the female sample and 27 for
the male one.
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Table A.6: Cultural correlates - types of settlements (Probit & Poisson estimates)
Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
violence violence attitude attitude attitude attitude
ever index dummy index dummy index
Settlements types
Nomadic 0.083** 1.243 -0.021 0.975 -0.016 1.002
(0.035) (0.223) (0.030) (0.063) (0.025) (0.079)
Isolated 0.044 1.221 0.053* 1.176* -0.030 0.945
(0.037) (0.232) (0.030) (0.101) (0.028) (0.114)
Compact -0.008 0.943 -0.020 0.971 -0.052*** 0.821**
(0.022) (0.127) (0.026) (0.065) (0.014) (0.066)
Observations 65,850 65,746 150,362 148,521 47,677 47,393
Pseudo R-squared 0.111 0.171 0.109
Mean dep. var. 0.270 0.577 0.475 1.428 0.306 0.725
Notes: Columns (1), (3) and (5) report probit estimates (marginal eects reported), while
columns (2), (4) and (6) report poisson estimates (incidence-rate ratios reported, mean-
ing that coecients are exponentiated). Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the
ethnicity level. ***, ** and * indicate signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
The omitted category is sedentary settlements. Column headings indicate the dependent
variable considered. The bottom line reports the mean of the dependent variable. Con-
trols include: age, education (years), wealth index, working dummy, number of births,
household size, partner's age and education, urban status, religion dummies and country
xed eects. Sample coverage: for actual violence (cols. 1-2) all 18 African countries
with domestic violence module are included; for violence attitudes (cols. 3-6) there are 28
African countries for the female sample and 27 for the male one.
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Table A.7: Cultural correlates - economic value of women (restricted sample)
Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4)
attitude attitude attitude attitude
dummy index dummy index
A. Brideprice -0.004 -0.031 -0.076*** -0.243***
(0.035) (0.134) (0.022) (0.071)
Observations 118,453 116,914 37,702 37,467
R-squared 0.178 0.190 0.110 0.110
Mean dep. var 0.453 1.306 0.295 0.676
B. Plough 0.042 0.002 0.064*** 0.056
(0.050) (0.174) (0.014) (0.041)
Observations 115,173 113,733 36,799 36,572
R-squared 0.178 0.186 0.110 0.108
Mean dep. var 0.458 1.325 0.296 0.681
C. Agriculture main source 0.028 0.074 -0.045 -0.209
(0.046) (0.171) (0.057) (0.188)
Observations 118,931 117,379 37,843 37,607
R-squared 0.179 0.190 0.108 0.108
Mean dep. var 0.454 1.311 0.295 0.677
D. Dependence on agriculture 0.095 0.173 0.031 0.037
(0.073) (0.259) (0.069) (0.207)
Observations 118,931 117,379 37,843 37,607
R-squared 0.179 0.190 0.108 0.108
Mean dep. var 0.454 1.311 0.295 0.677
E. Dependence on gathering -0.058 0.225 -0.186 -0.294
(0.189) (0.722) (0.190) (0.510)
Observations 118,931 117,379 37,843 37,607
R-squared 0.178 0.190 0.109 0.108
Mean dep. var 0.454 1.311 0.295 0.677
F. Dependence on hunting 0.227 0.499 0.102 0.239
(0.198) (0.811) (0.226) (0.617)
Observations 118,931 117,379 37,843 37,607
R-squared 0.179 0.190 0.108 0.108
Mean dep. var 0.454 1.311 0.295 0.677
G. Dependence on shing -0.135 -0.391 0.122 0.175
(0.110) (0.389) (0.081) (0.232)
Observations 118,931 117,379 37,843 37,607
R-squared 0.179 0.190 0.109 0.108
Mean dep. var 0.454 1.311 0.295 0.677
Table A.7: Cultural correlates - economic value of women (restricted sample) - CONT.
Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4)
attitude attitude attitude attitude
dummy index dummy index
H. Dependence on husbandry -0.087 -0.090 -0.152 -0.202
(0.092) (0.358) (0.103) (0.292)
Observations 118,931 117,379 37,843 37,607
R-squared 0.179 0.190 0.109 0.108
Mean dep. var. 0.454 1.311 0.295 0.677
I. Plough-positive crops 0.185*** 0.767*** 0.083 0.194
(0.069) (0.271) (0.072) (0.209)
Plough-negative crops 0.037 0.310 0.001 0.097
(0.060) (0.219) (0.075) (0.188)
Observations 116,115 114,628 36,842 36,616
R-squared 0.181 0.192 0.109 0.109
Mean dep. var. 0.454 1.316 0.295 0.679
Equality of coecients (p-value) 0.040 0.014 0.406 0.654
Notes: OLS estimates. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the ethnicity level.
***, ** and * indicate signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Column
headings indicate the dependent variable considered. The bottom line reports the mean of
the dependent variable. Controls include: age, education (years), wealth index, working
dummy, number of births, household size, partner's age and education, urban status,
religion dummies and country xed eects. Sample coverage: in order to double check
previous estimates, the sample has been restricted to only those countries for which the
domestic violence module is available.
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Table A.8: Cultural correlates - marriage patterns (restricted sample)
Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4)
attitude attitude attitude attitude
dummy index dummy index
A. Endogamy 0.009 0.114 0.061*** 0.197***
(0.023) (0.097) (0.018) (0.065)
Observations 111,395 109,963 35,206 34,994
R-squared 0.183 0.193 0.115 0.115
Mean dep. var 0.451 1.311 0.291 0.667
B. Stem family -0.021 -0.102 -0.007 -0.063
(0.024) (0.092) (0.017) (0.040)
Observations 118,626 117,075 37,748 37,512
R-squared 0.178 0.190 0.108 0.108
Mean dep. var 0.455 1.315 0.296 0.678
C. Polygyny -0.031 -0.307*** 0.117 0.195
(0.019) (0.042) (0.102) (0.296)
Observations 118,014 116,478 37,281 37,051
R-squared 0.179 0.190 0.110 0.109
Mean dep. var 0.455 1.314 0.296 0.679
D. Virilocality 0.007 0.074 -0.015 0.007
(0.028) (0.099) (0.023) (0.063)
Observations 118,243 116,708 37,355 37,125
R-squared 0.179 0.190 0.111 0.110
Mean dep. var 0.453 1.310 0.295 0.678
Notes: OLS estimates. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the ethnicity level.
***, ** and * indicate signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Column
headings indicate the dependent variable considered. The bottom line reports the mean of
the dependent variable. Controls include: age, education (years), wealth index, working
dummy, number of births, household size, partner's age and education, urban status,
religion dummies and country xed eects. Sample coverage: in order to double check
previous estimates, the sample has been restricted to only those countries for which the
domestic violence module is available.
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Table A.9: Cultural correlates - types of settlements (restricted sample)
Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4)
attitude attitude attitude attitude
dummy index dummy index
Settlements types
Nomadic -0.032 0.009 0.112*** 0.491***
(0.076) (0.278) (0.034) (0.181)
Isolated 0.075* 0.343** -0.037 -0.060
(0.041) (0.166) (0.035) (0.105)
Compact -0.007 0.032 -0.041*** -0.118**
(0.034) (0.112) (0.014) (0.047)
Observations 114,966 113,526 36,743 36,517
R-squared 0.179 0.188 0.111 0.110
Mean dep. var 0.459 1.327 0.296 0.681
Notes: OLS estimates. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the ethnicity level.
***, ** and * indicate signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The omit-
ted category is sedentary settlements. Column headings indicate the dependent variable
considered. The bottom line reports the mean of the dependent variable. Controls in-
clude: age, education (years), wealth index, working dummy, number of births, household
size, partner's age and education, urban status, religion dummies and country xed ef-
fects. Sample coverage: in order to double check previous estimates, the sample has been
restricted to only those countries for which the domestic violence module is available.
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A2 Dependent variables
The individual-level data on violence exposure are taken from the most
recent wave of the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). The dummy
called `Violence ever', indicates whether the woman has ever been victim
of at least one form of domestic violence, and the `Violence index', is the
sum of dierent forms of intimate partner violence to which the woman has
ever been exposed. We need to restrict the attention to six dierent forms
of aggressions common to all the countries included in the sample31. The
list of violence related questions is in Appendix Table A.10.
Table A.10: Questions about domestic violence, perpetrated by spouse
Types of Violence DHS Questions
Physical Violence (1) Ever been pushed, shook or had something thrown
(2) Ever been slapped
(3) Ever been punched with st or hit by something harmful
(4) Ever been kicked or dragged
(5) Ever been strangled or burnt
Sexual Violence (6) Ever been physically forced into unwanted sexual intercourse
Notes: Source: DHS, Women's Questionnaire.
Concerning women's and men's attitudes towards domestic violence, we
take the individual-level data on the acceptance of violence from women
and men DHS datasets, respectively. These two datasets contain a set of
attitudinal measures that reect some combination of women's and men's
attitudes towards both spousal violence and women. Five questions in the
DHS ask respondents about the circumstances under which it would be
acceptable for a man to beat his wife. These circumstances are: wife goes
out without telling him; wife neglects the children; wife argues with him; wife
refuses to have sex with him; wife burns the food. As our dependent variable,
we use a `Violence attitude dummy', equal to 1 if the respondent believes that
violence is acceptable in at least one out of the ve circumstances included
in the survey. In addition, we construct a `Violence attitude index', given
by the sum of the circumstances in which the respondent thinks it would be
acceptable for a man to beat his wife.
31Some questions on the occurence of specic types of either physical or sexual violence




Brideprice: it is a dummy variable, indicating whether the prevalent mode of
marriage prior to industrialization was characterized by brideprice or wealth
to bride's family, bride service to bride's family or token brideprice. It comes
from variable v6 of the Ethnographic Atlas.
Plough: the measure is constructed from variable v39 of the Ethnographic
Atlas. According to this variable, ethnicities are classied into one of the
following mutual exclusive categories: (i) the plough was absent; (ii) the
plough existed but it was not aboriginal; and (iii) the plough was aborig-
inal and found in the society prior to contact. Using this categorization,
we construct an indicator variable equal to 1 if the society used the plough
(without distinguishing between aboriginal or not) and 0 otherwise.
Agriculture main source: it is a dummy variable, constructed from variable
v42 of the Ethnographic Atlas. Ethnicities are grouped into one of the fol-
lowing categories: (i) gathering contributes most; (ii) shing contributes
most; (iii) hunting contributes most; (iv) pastoralism contributes most; (v)
casual agriculture contributes most; (vi) extensive agriculture contributes
most; (vii) intensive agriculture contributes most; (viii) two or more sources
equally contribute; (ix) agriculture contributes most (type unknown). Our
constructed indicator variable captures societies belonging to categories (v),
(vi), (vii) or (ix).
Dependence on agriculture/gathering/hunting/shing/husbandry: we mea-
sure the level of dependence from these ve production activities using vari-
ables v1, v2, v3, v4 and v5 of Murdock's Atlas, which report the share of
subsistence obtained from each activity into 9 broad bands. Our measures
of dependence on these activities are generated using the middle point of
these intervals.
Female participation in agriculture/gathering/hunting/shing/husbandry: the
measure uses variables v50, v51, v52, v53 and v54 from the Ethnographic
Atlas. Ethnicities are grouped into one of the following categories measuring
female participation in each of the activities of interest: (i) males only; (ii)
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males appreciably more; (iii) equal participation32; (iv) females appreciably
more; (v) females only33. We construct an indicator variable that takes value
1 if there was equal gender participation or if women contributed more than
men or if women were the only participants to the considered production
activity.
Endogamy: it is constructed from variable v15 of the Ethnographic Atlas.
Stem family: it is constructed from variable v8 of the Ethnographic Atlas,
to identify ethnic groups historically characterized by stem families. The
other categories in the original variable include: independent nuclear fam-
ily (both monogamous and occasional polygyny), independent polyandrous
families, polygynous (distinguishing between unusual co-wives pattern and
usual co-wives pattern), and large extended family.
Polygyny: the measure uses variable v9 from the Ethnographic Atlas, which
classies ethnicities into the following categories based on marital compo-
sition: (i) independent nuclear (monogamous); (ii) occasional polygyny;
(iii) preferentially sororal (cowives in same dwellings); (iv) preferentially
sororal (cowives in separate dwellings); (v) non-sororal (cowives in separate
dwellings); (vi) non-sororal (cowives in same dwellings); and (vii) indepen-
dent polyandrous families. Our constructed indicator variable captures so-
cieties belonging to categories (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) or (vi).
Virilocality: it is constructed from variable v12 of the Ethnographic Atlas.
Ethnicities are grouped into the following categories based on postmarital
residence rules: (i) avunculal; (ii) ambilocal; (iii) optionally uxorilocal or
avunculocal; (iv)optionally patrilocal or avunculocal; (v) matrilocal; (vi)
neolocal; (vii) no common residence; (viii) patrilocal; (ix) uxorilocal; and
(x) virilocal. We create an indicator for ethnic groups that are patrilocal or
virilocal.
Nomadic/sedentary/isolated/compact settlements: this measure comes from
variale v30 of Murdock's Atlas. Ethnicities are grouped into the following
32The original classication in Murdock's Atlas makes a distinction between \dierenti-
ated but equal participation" and \equal participation, no marked dierentiation". Since
this distinction is not relevant for our purpose, we decide to combine these two categories.
33If the activity is present but sex participation is not specied or if the activity is
absent, then there is no measure of female participation.
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categories based on settlement patterns: (i) nomadic or fully migratory;
(ii) seminomadic; (iii) semisedentary; (iv) compact but impermanent set-
tlements; (v) neighborhood of dispersed family homesteads; (vi) separeted
hamlets forming a single community; (vii) compact and permanent settle-
ments; and (viii) complex settlements. Starting from this classication, we
create a dummy `Nomadic' equal to one for societies belonging to categories
(i) or (ii), a dummy `Isolated', equal to one for societies beloging to category
(v), a dummy `Compact', which refers to those ethnic groups belonging to
categories (iv) or (vii), and a dummy `Sedentary', including societies be-
longing to categories (iii), (v), (vi), (vii) or (viii).
A3.2 Contemporary controls
We use a set of individual covariates as contemporary controls in all our
regressions. Most of them are straightforward, like age etc. The wealth index
is a continuous variable, calculated by the DHS using data on a household's
ownership of selected assets, materials used for housing construction and
types of water access and sanitation facilities. All these variables come from
the DHS.
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